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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, 
Appellant/Petitioner 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
Appellee/Respondent 
Supreme Court Case No. 20060950 
OPC No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-
0448 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah Supreme Court concerning that committee's decision in In re 
Travis Bowen, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Recommendation of Discipline: 
Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1, 2006). The 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. In re Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, \ 11, 104 P.3d 1220. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order 
of public reprimand issued by the Utah State Bar? 
Issue 2: Should the Supreme Court void an order of public discipline where a 
member of the committee recommending the discipline has a conflict of interest that 
would almost certainly require a similarly situated judge to recuse herself? 
vi 
Issue 3: Who bears the burden of discovering and disclosing Committee member 
conflicts of interest in a disciplinary proceeding? 
Standards of Review: Attorney discipline cases come before the Supreme Court 
as matters of original jurisdiction and are reviewed in that light. Harding, 2004 UT f 11. 
The Supreme Court has "no obligation to defer to the conclusions of any other body." 
Id., % 12. 
Statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in trial court: 
Petitioner was not aware of the conflict of interest until after this matter was heard before 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, therefore petitioner was not required to preserve the 
conflict issue for appeal on the record. 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion under review is In re Travis Bow en, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 
05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1, 2006), Addendum 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following relevant statutes and rules is reproduced in Addendum 6: 
Utah Const, art. VIII § 4 
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1 
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002) 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) 
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7 
vii 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-503 (also "Rule 3") 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-510 (also "Rule 10") 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-511 (also "Rule 11") 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-513 (also "Rule 13") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 1, 2006, a screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Utah Supreme Court (the "screening panel") made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law determining that Petitioner had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
screening panel issued a recommendation that Travis L. Bowen receive a public 
reprimand. Mr. Bowen completed an exception to that recommendation. On June 30, 
2006, the Chair of the Committee issued an Order of Discipline for Mr. Bowen. 
One screening panel member was, and still is, a partner in a law firm that was 
representing the plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, a million dollar lawsuit against multiple 
defendants, including Mr. Bowen. This screening panel member did not disclose her law 
firm's conflict of interest during the disciplinary proceedings. 
Petitioner sought judicial intervention from the Third District Court, State of Utah, 
requesting an order against the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
staying the publication of the reprimand. The OPC moved to dismiss, on the grounds that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issues were briefed by 
both parties. Prior to the court issuing a ruling, the OPC published the reprimand in the 
September-October edition of the Utah State Bar Journal. 
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A few days after the Bar Journal was circulated, James Magleby, a partner in the 
Magleby & Greenwood, attempted to use the public reprimand as evidence against Mr. 
Bowen in the law suit Neffv. Neff. 
Given the OPC's publication of the reprimand without waiting for the District 
Court's ruling on jurisdiction, Mr. Bowen withdrew his petition. Mr. Bowen now 
appeals the findings of the Panel and the Chair's order of discipline on the basis that his 
due process rights were violated by the material conflict of interest of a screening panel 
member. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an appeal of public 
discipline issued by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court. 
Harding, 2001 UT % 11. Though no rule of appellate procedure specifically governs 
appeals from the Ethics and Discipline Committee, Article VIII section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution indicates that the Supreme Court must maintain the power to review all 
attorney discipline in the State of Utah. Petitioner has standing to bring this case. 
Point II: Christine Greenwood, a member of the screening panel recommending 
that Mr. Bowen receive a public reprimand, is the vice president of Magleby & 
Greenwood. Magleby & Greenwood is counsel for plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, case number 
030100275, an ongoing, high stakes litigation in the First District Court of Utah, where 
Travis Bowen is one of the named defendants. See Addendum 3. Both Utah cases and 
advisory rules from the American Bar Association suggest that where such conflicts exist 
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and committee members do not recuse themselves, the findings and actions of such 
committees are voidable. Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 
(Utah 1985); American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002), reproduced in Addendum 6. 
Point III: Attorneys and judges must recuse themselves where they have conflicts 
of interest. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1; Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. 
While no rule explicitly places the burden to discover and disclose conflicts on any 
person, it is much more practical to place that burden upon committee members who sit 
in judgment of other attorneys. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Supreme Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear An Appeal Of A Public 
Reprimand. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review an order of public reprimand issued 
by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
exclusive power to govern the practice of law including discipline of attorneys. Utah 
Const, art. VIII § 4. The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court 
reviews informal complaints via screening panels and recommends the action to be taken 
on any informal complaint. Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 3. After a screening 
panel of the Committee recommends that an attorney be publicly reprimanded, the 
respondent may file an exception and request a hearing. Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and 
Disab. Rule 10. The hearing takes place in front of the Chair of that Committee. Id. The 
respondent attorney has the burden of showing that recommendation is unreasonable or 
otherwise clearly erroneous. Id. The rules neither provide for nor prohibit an appeal of 
the Committee Chair's final order of discipline. The Committee members are members 
of the Bar and members of the public. Id., Rule 3. The Supreme Court appoints 
Committee members. Id. The Bar is a private corporation and has no authority to 
publicly discipline attorneys absent explicit authorization from the Supreme Court. 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 804 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1991). Whenever the Committee 
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takes public disciplinary action it does so in a judicial capacity on behalf of the Supreme 
Court. Id.; Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab., Rule 13.l 
Prior versions of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability explicitly provided 
for respondents to appeal an order by the Bar Association. In Re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 
(Utah 1997). In re Babilis concerned the rights of parties to appeal the recommendation 
of "the Board/5 which performed essentially the same function the screening panel now 
performs. The Court read the prior version of Rule 11(g) as giving parties a right to 
appeal recommendations of the Board as well as rulings of the District Court even where 
that appeal right was not explicit. In that case the Court used a superseded version of the 
Procedures of Discipline which "explicitly permitted both the 'attorney [and] Bar 
counsel' to file a formal appeal from the recommendations of the Board to [the Supreme] 
Court." Id. at 213. The Court held that both respondent and the Office of Professional 
Conduct may appeal a recommendation. Id. 
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability have undergone further changes 
since 1997 when Babilis was decided. At that time RLDD rule 11(g) read, "any order of 
public discipline may be appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure." Id. at 214. The same rule now reads, "Any discipline order by the 
district court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court through a petition for review 
1
 The Bar does, in fact, issue orders of public reprimand, but only does so in a judicial 
capacity on behalf of the Supreme Court. Petitioner does not dispute that the Bar is 
procedurally permitted to do so, but merely argues that because public discipline, 
including reprimands, is a function of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court must be 
able to review the Bar's actions. A contrary interpretation would be an unconstitutional 
relinquishing of authority. 
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pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. 
Rule 11(g) (2003). The rules are silent as to decisions or orders by the Committee Chair 
on informal complaints. 
One possible interpretation of this revision is that the Supreme Court wanted to 
surrender its original jurisdiction of all informal disciplinary proceedings. This cannot be 
the correct interpretation under Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. The Court has 
emphasized that the role of the Bar in the enforcement of the rules of attorney discipline 
is a limited one. Babilis, 951 P.2d at 214. The Bar "has no power to order disbarment, 
suspension, public reprimand, or restitution on its own authority''' Barnard, 804 P.2d at 
529 (emphasis added). Complete surrender of review authority in informal complaints 
does not make sense where the Utah Constitution gives the Supreme Court all power to 
regulate attorneys, and the Supreme Court's explicit ruling limits the Bar. The language 
of the rules should not be read as foreclosing an attorney's right to Petition the Court for 
review of the Committee's order of public reprimand. 
A more sensible interpretation of the rule is that there is no question that the 
Committee is acting in an official capacity, and is therefore inherently subject to review 
by the Supreme Court. If this interpretation is correct, it would be totally unnecessary for 
the rules to contain a procedure for appeal to the Supreme Court. 
This is not to say the Supreme Court should be required to hear appeals of orders 
from the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The Court can and may have chosen not to 
create an automatic appeal as of right from an informal disciplinary proceeding resulting 
in a public reprimand. This does not mean that the Court cannot exercise its power of 
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discretionary review in a bar discipline case, when it so chooses. The clear due process 
violations under the facts of this case beg for a review by this Court. 
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to leave the Committee completely 
unchecked in issuing public reprimands. Such delegation would likely violate the Utah 
Constitution, given the Supreme Court's role in regulating the practice of law. Attorney 
discipline cases come before the Supreme Court as matters of original jurisdiction rather 
than a traditional appeal. In re Harding, 2004 UT ffif 11-12, 104 P.3d 1220. Even if the 
Supreme Court uses the Bar to collect information and expedite the disciplinary process, 
the Court retains plenary powers over attorney discipline. Id. 
This court has jurisdiction to review the June 30th order of discipline on the 
grounds that Mr. Bowen's due process rights to a fair hearing were violated. Denial of 
this appeal would be contrary to the Utah Constitution and would result in substantial 
injustice. 
B. Petitioner Has Standing To Request Review Of The Committee's 
Recommendation. 
A person has standing to challenge government action if that person has a concrete 
stake in the outcome of the controversy. A plaintiff has sufficient stake in the 
controversy if he can show injury in fact, caused by the government, and that the injury 
will be remedied by a decision in his favor. See, e.g. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
669, 688-690 (1973). Mr. Bowen has been injured by the Bar's actions, and because the 
Bar was acting to publicly discipline an attorney, those actions should be deemed state 
action. The injury Mr. Bowen suffered could be remedied by a favorable decision from 
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this Court. The remedy could include declaring that the reprimand is void, ordering the 
Bar to publish a retraction in the next edition of the Bar Journal, or any other relief the 
Court finds appropriate. 
Even if the Court determines Petitioner's claim is moot, he should be entitled to 
challenge the Committee's findings and order because the injury is capable of repetition 
yet evading review. In re Discipline of Johnson, 2001 UT 110, % 15, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 
2001). The Bar cannot reasonably take the position that Petitioner's argument is moot 
simply because it already published the reprimand. If so, the Bar would be able to 
circumvent any challenge to orders of public reprimand, no matter how improper the 
procedure, simply by publishing the reprimand. 
Mr. Bowen does have standing to challenge the public reprimand because he can 
show injury, causation, and redressability, or because the injury is capable of repetition 
yet evading review. The Supreme Court unquestionably has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. 
C. The Court Should Void The Public Reprimand And Order The Bar 
Association To Publish A Retraction. 
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a state action resulting in 
stigma to a person's reputation plus loss of employment or associational opportunities 
should be declared void where the decision is tainted by a biased decision maker. While 
all government actions require fair process, what constitutes fair process varies according 
to the circumstances of the deprivation. A court should weigh: (1) the importance of the 
individual interest; (2) the value of specific procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
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government interest in efficiency. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). As will 
be shown, the individual interest here is recognized by courts as important, the procedural 
violation alleged is clearly recognized and among the most basic, and government 
efficiency is not jeopardized. 
First, actions of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court 
are state actions. When the Bar acts to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is 
acting as an arm of the Supreme Court. Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 2000 UT 96, If 9, 16 
P.3d 1230 (Utah 2000). Whenever the Committee takes public disciplinary action, it 
does so in a judicial capacity and on behalf of the Supreme Court. Barnard, 804 P.2d at 
529; Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 13. Committee members receive the same 
immunity that judges receive. Id. The Utah State Bar has no authority to publicly 
discipline attorneys absent explicit authorization from the Supreme Court. Barnard, 804 
P.2d at 529. Though neither an administrative agency nor a court, due process requires 
the screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court 
be governed by the same principles as administrative law judges and trial judges because 
its actions are state action. 
Because actions by the Bar should be deemed state action, Matthews v. Eldridge 
provides the framework for determining whether the action involved a due process 
violation. One circumstance where the individual interest portion of the test triggers the 
due process clause is known as the "stigma plus" situation. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 
(1976). Where a government action results in stigma to a person's reputation plus loss of 
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employment or associational opportunities, there is a loss of liberty. Id. Such state action 
is sufficient to require procedural due process. Id. 
The public reprimand issued by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court meets the stigma plus test. Prior to the reprimand, Mr. Bowen was an 
attorney in good standing with the bar. The purpose of a public reprimand is to warn the 
public that an attorney might act in an unethical manner. See, Commentary, ABA 
Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Disc, Procedure for Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 17. A 
reprimand cautions potential clients and associates against forming professional 
relationships. It changes his status with the Bar and affects his livelihood. 
Matthews v. Eldridge requires that where a loss of liberty is involved, procedural 
safeguards must be in place to ensure that the deprivation is not erroneous. One of the 
most fundamental and valuable procedural safeguards of due process is that all parties to 
a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. Anderson v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 
696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). This requires absence of actual bias and endeavors to 
prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. Where a member of a group that 
investigates facts and recommends public punishment of an individual has a materially 
adverse interest to the subject of that proceeding, unfairness is not only possible, it is 
presumed. Id;Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Anderson, though obviously not binding, is illustrative of this type of bias and 
instructive as to when these standards should apply. In that case, Ms. Anderson appealed 
the finding of an administrative adjudication. On appeal, the original judge had been 
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replaced by the person who was counsel opposed to Ms. Anderson in the original 
adjudication. Using the statutory provisions governing the recusal of trial judges to 
provide guidance, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judge stating: 
"Fairness requires not only the absence of actual bias, but endeavors to 
prevent even the possibility of unfairness. This principle applies with as 
much force to administrative hearings as it does to judicial trials. [Utah 
Code § 78-7-1(3)] requires a trial judge to disqualify himself if he has 
previously appeared as an attorney in the case. Although this statute does 
not literally apply to administrative proceedings, the principal it embodies 
is a useful and persuasive guide in reviewing administrative proceedings... 
When a judge has previously been involved in a case as an attorney, there is 
no need to show actual prejudice. The law presumes prejudice in such 
circumstances." 
Anderson, 696 P.2d at 1221. It is reasonable to apply the same type of analysis to 
Committee members in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. 
The same code section requiring disqualification of a judge where she has been an 
attorney or counsel to either party also requires disqualification where the judge is a party 
or otherwise interested. 78 Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1. There is no reason not to apply the 
same standards to attorney discipline proceedings by the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. Indeed, the American Bar Association's Model 
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement suggest recusal should be required. Model 
Rule I.2.F (2002) requires Committee members, referred to in the model rules as "board 
members," to "refrain from taking part in any proceeding in which a judge, similarly 
situated, would be required to abstain." See Addendum 6. 
On March 1, 2006, the Committee recommended that Travis Bowen receive a 
public reprimand. One member of the panel that issued the recommendation was 
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Christine Greenwood. Ms. Greenwood is a partner and vice president of Magleby & 
Greenwood, P.C.. See supra Addendum 4. James Magleby of Magleby and Greenwood, 
is counsel for plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, case number 030100275, an ongoing case in the 
First District Court of Utah. See supra Addendum 3. This case was underway and Travis 
Bowen, as an individual and as a Professional Corporation, was a named defendant at the 
time of the public reprimand. 
On September 19, 2006, Ms. Greenwood's partner in Magleby & Greenwood, 
James Magleby, brought a copy of the Bar Journal to oral arguments and used the public 
reprimand in opposing Bowen's motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2006, 
Mr. Magleby made a "Supplemental filing relating to Bowen Defendant's Motions for 
Summary Judgment." See Addendum 3. Item "I" in that filing concerns Mr. Bowen's 
public reprimand. Mr. Magleby states: 
"Plaintiff hereby supplements the record by submitting the Public 
Reprimand report against Bowen.. . . In addition to being directly relevant 
to credibility and intent, the transgressions by Bowen of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct reported in the Public Reprimand also bear striking 
similarity to issues before the court on Bowen's motions." 
Supra Addendum 3, p. 2. Mr. Maglebly's argument demonstrates why the conflict in this 
case meets the second part of the stigma plus test. In addition to other employment or 
associational problems that might arise from a public reprimand, the reprimand here has 
deepened Mr. Bowen's involvement in costly and public litigation. Additionally, the 
defendants in Bowen v. Burton, et. al., case no. 040927356, Third Judicial District Court, 
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wasted no time in including the reprimand in their Motion to Compel Discovery. Both 
of these episodes demonstrate why the disciplinary procedure violated due process. 
Ms. Greenwood was only one member of a screening panel that determined that 
Mr. Bowen had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended a public 
reprimand, but her presumed bias is sufficient to void the entire panel's findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommendation. Padilla, 839 P.2d at 877 (Bias presumed when 
Parole Board member recuses herself and sits with the victim's family even when the 
board member does not participate in the decision making process). When a biased 
person sits on a panel, "[t]he infection of the concurrence of the interested person 
spreads, so that the action of the whole body is voidable." Id.; quoting Pratt v. Mayor of 
Dunellen, 89 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1952). Because such a violation occurred here, the panel 
violated Mr. Bowen's due process rights to a fair hearing. Id. Ms. Greenwood's 
presence renders any action subsequent to that recommendation voidable. 
Finally, it is true that this court has addressed whether the Lawyer Disciplinary 
process satisfies due process requirements. Harding, 104 P.3d 1220. In Harding the 
court found that the measures outlined in the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
are adequate to ensure due process to a lawyer accused of misconduct. This case is much 
different from Harding. For example, in Harding the proceeding was a formal complaint 
allowing for confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination. 
2
 These same individuals filed the initial Bar Complaint against Mr. Bowen that is the 
subject of this petition. 
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D. Principles Governing Lawyers And Judges Suggest That A Committee 
Member Should Have The Affirmative Duty To Discover And Disclose 
All Conflicts Of Interest. 
Judges and attorneys have a duty to determine when conflicts exist, and obtain 
consent from clients or parties to act as a judge or an attorney if a conflict does exist. 
See, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7; Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3. In a 
situation such as this, where an attorney sits on the Supreme Court's Ethics and 
Discipline Committee in judgment of another, the Committee member should have a duty 
to discover and disclose conflicts. 
Judges have the duty to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all 
activities. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2. Judges shall act to promote "public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. Judges should 
disqualify themselves in any proceeding when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned including circumstances where the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice . . . 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." (Code 
of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1).) Members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Supreme Court are not judges, but they are acting as "an arm of the Supreme Court." 
Pendleton, 2000 UT f^ 9. Even though the rules governing judicial recusal or the Code of 
Judicial Conduct do not directly apply to them, the same principles that are used to 
inspire confidence in the judiciary can well be extended to inspire confidence in the 
Committee. Anderson, 696 P.2d at 1221 (Rules requiring recusal of judges apply to 
administrative judges, even though not explicitly required by the statute). 
l i 
As Ms. Greenwood's partner pointed out, this case involves a disciplinary matter 
bearing "striking similarity to issues before the court" in Neffv. Neff, a high stakes 
litigation where that plaintiff is represented by Ms. Greenwood's firm. (See Addendum 
B, Neffv. Neff, Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen Defendant's Motions for 
Summary Judgment). The connection involves both bias, in that Ms. Greenwood's firm 
believed a public reprimand was financially beneficial to its success in the litigation, and 
personal knowledge of facts concerning Mr. Bowen's activities. These factors are 
presumed to influence Ms. Greenwood's role as a third party neutral. Anderson, 696 P.2d 
at 1221. 
Respondent takes the position that the bias should not be considered because 
"there is no evidence that she was interested in this proceeding, nor is there any evidence 
that Mr. Magleby's use of the Utah Bar Journal summary of Mr. Bowen's public 
reprimand has resulted in any decision adverse to Mr. Bowen." (Respondent's Brief 
p. 12, emphasis in original). This argument demonstrates an incorrect understanding of 
the conflicts laws and the purposes for which attorneys and judges are subject to recusal. 
Bias is not determined by retrospective analysis of the results of a particular proceeding, 
but by ex ante analysis of whether or not the decisionmaker might be consciously or 
subconsciously influenced by his or her personal incentive in reaching a particular 
outcome. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E). Rule 1.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct also takes an ex ante approach to analyzing conflicts and would 
certainly not permit the defense raised by the Bar, that in retrospect the public reprimand 
has not resulted in any ruling or decision adverse to Mr. Bowen. Regardless of the view 
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taken, Ms. Greenwood's partner has proven that either an ex ante or ex post analysis 
shows a conflict. Ms. Greenwood should have recused herself because "a judge, 
similarly situated" would have been required to recuse herself from this proceeding. See 
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002). 
It is also useful to examine rules regarding how attorneys must handle conflicts of 
interest with clients. Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys have a duty to 
investigate potential conflicts of interest among different clients. An attorney may not 
represent a client when she has a conflict unless all relevant parties give written consent. 
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7. Conflicts are bad because they bring an attorney's 
independent judgment into question. (Comment, Rule 1.7. f 1.) The conflict may not be 
waived in some situations. "To determine if a conflict exists, a lawyer should adopt 
reasonable procedures appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine 
in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the persons and issues involved. Ignorance 
caused by a failure to institute such procedures does not excuse a lawyer's violation of 
this Rule." (Comment, Rule 1.7.13.) 
If Committee members have no duty to identify and disclose conflicts, this leads to 
a strange result. In everyday operation of her business, a Committee member such as Ms. 
Greenwood has the affirmative duty of checking for conflicts. Id. When she sits in an 
esteemed position judging another member of the profession, she has no duty to discover 
or avoid conflicts of interest. Ironically, one of the alleged rule violations for which Mr. 
Bowen was reprimanded was Rule 1.7, Conflicts of Interest. (See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand.) A 
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Committee member with a clear, though then undiscovered, conflict of interest took part 
in reprimanding Mr. Bowen for conflicts of interest. 
A few jurisdictions have adopted conflicts rules for attorneys when serving as 
neutral third party decisionmakers, explicitly placing the burden to discover and disclose 
conflicts of interest to the parties. Thomas v. City of North Las Vegas, 127 P.3d 1057 
(Nev. 2006); In re Report of The Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy 
Committee on Senior Judges as Mediators, 915 So.2d 145 (Fla. 2005). The Supreme 
Court should adopt such a rule for Committee members as well. 
The alternative is to place the burden of discovering conflicts of interest on the 
attorney who is appearing before the Committee. An attorney respondent does not know 
the names of all of the Committee members' partners or associates. He or she cannot 
possibly be expected to run a conflicts check on all the Committee members, all of their 
partners, and all of their associates instantly on the day of a hearing. The attorney 
respondent may or may not have ever met or heard of the Committee members before. 
Everything about the disciplinary proceeding indicates that Committee members are in a 
better position to investigate possible conflicts of interest prior to a disciplinary hearing. 
They should have the burden of discovering and disclosing conflicts. 
In the present case, when Ms. Greenwood's partner initiated the lawsuit against 
Mr. Bowen, he was not affiliated with Ms. Greenwood, but was an attorney at Ballard, 
Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll. (Addendum C, Affidavit of Travis Bowen.) Though Ms. 
Greenwood stated her name and law firm, she did not state the names of her partners. 
She did not identify any conflict of interest. Respondent's rule would require a person in 
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front of the committee to instantly perform a conflicts check of every case he is involved 
in personally or as an attorney to determine whether or not the panel member has any 
conflicts. Mr. Bowen was not able to perform any such check, but suffice to say, he was 
not aware of any conflict until well after the committee issued its findings. 
To remedy the violation and avoid this problem in the future, there should be a 
requirement that attorneys who sit as Committee members, in judgment of other 
attorneys, must discover and disclose conflicts of interest. Where a conflict is discovered 
after a disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court should overturn the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that resulted from that proceeding and remand for a new hearing. 
A new hearing would best be conducted in front of the district court. 
E. Mr. Bowen Did Not Waive The Conflict. 
An attorney waives a conflict if he is aware of the conflict while his case is before 
the hearing panel and he does not object. Virginia State Bar ex rel SecondDist 
Committee 634 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Va. 2006). Where the attorney is not aware of the 
conflict, he does not waive the conflict. Id. 
Petitioner did not associate Ms. Greenwood's name and law firm's name with the 
pending civil litigation against him. (Addendum 5.) Though Ms. Greenwood introduced 
herself and gave her law firm's name, she did not identify the conflict of interest. Id. 
She did not state that she was affiliated with James Magleby, who was prosecuting a civil 
lawsuit in the First District Court against petitioner. Id. At the time the lawsuit 
commenced against petitioner, Mr. Magleby was an attorney at Ballard, Spahr, Andrews 
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& Ingersoll. Petitioner did not realize that Mr. Magleby changed firms. Id, If Petitioner 
was aware of this conflict, he would have objected to Ms. Greenwood's presence on the 
committee. Id. 
Where petitioner was unaware of the conflict of interest, he did not waive the 
conflict. 
F. The Court Should Order The Bar To Issue A Public Retraction of The 
Reprimand And Proceed By Formal Complaint In The District Court. 
There can be no doubt that Ms. Greenwood was an interested party at the time of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee's ruling against Mr. Bowen. As such, the Discipline 
Committee's findings and conclusions must be presumed tainted and voidable. For these 
reasons, Mr. Bowen requests this Court issue a declaratory judgment voiding the 
Committee's findings and the Chair's order of public reprimand. The Bar should also be 
required to publish a retraction of the reprimand at the next printing of the Utah Bar 
Journal. A public retraction is the only remedy to the damage Mr. Bowen has 
experienced to his professional reputation. Also, Mr. Bowen requests that the court 
remand this case to the Utah Bar with instructions to proceed by way of formal 
complaint. Based on Padilla, the Court should assume the findings of fact tainted, and 
that the tainting conflict of interest penetrates the entire Ethics and Discipline Committee, 
including the Chair. If the Court were to order a different screening panel to rehear the 
complaint, the bias would not be eliminated. The rules specifically allow for review in an 
informal proceeding from the screening panel's findings of fact before the Chair. In this 
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case, Mr. Bowen exercised that right and asked the Chair to review findings of fact 
tainted by Ms. Greenwood's presence on the screening panel. 
The Bar has clearly taken the position that Mr. Bowen is entitled to no judicial 
review in the District Court of the screening panel's findings. If the Bar is allowed to 
simply proceed by way of informal complaint, Mr. Bowen would be left with no review 
of the screening panel's findings by a trier of fact untainted by the prior proceedings. At 
this point the only way to proceed on remand is by formal complaint. This would allow 
for an untainted, on the record, decision making process by unbiased decision makers. 
3




Mr. Bowen should be allowed to appeal an order of Public Reprimand from the 
Ethics and Disciple Committee where the committee is acting in an official capacity as an 
arm of the Supreme Court. Where a member of the panel recommending the public 
reprimand was an interested party, the reprimand should be declared void. The court 
should issue a declaratory judgment voiding the Order of Public Reprimand, order a 
retraction, and remand the case with instructions to the Utah Bar to proceed by way of 
formal complaint in the District Court. 
DATED this /£?/Aday of January, 2007. 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 'c day of January, 2007,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, by United States first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the 
following: 
Billy Walker 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Skordas, Caston, & Hyde 
ADDENDA 
1. In re Travis Bowen, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Recommendation of 
Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1, 
2006). 
2. In re Travis Bowen, Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-
0433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (June 30, 2006) 
3. Plaintiffs Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, case number 030100275 (October 4, 2006). 
4. Business Entity Search, https://secure.utah.gov/bes, September 21, 2006. 
5. Affidavit of Travis L. Bowen 
6. Statutes and Rules as follows: 
Utah Const, art. VIII § 4 
78 Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1 
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 1.2.F (2002) 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) 
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7 
Utah Rules Lwyr Disc, and Disab. Rule 3 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 10 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 11 
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 13 
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ADDENDUM 1 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Travis Bowen, #00397 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0448, 
05-0628 
The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite, Michael 
Walch, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before 
Screening Panel "C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr, Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman 
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles 
Gruber and Mary Anne Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel, 
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). 
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating 
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications 
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm 
Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes 
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. 
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an 
excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the 
service. 
2. Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 for the 
office furniture. 
3. The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged 
for similar legal services in this community. 
4. Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the 
work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. 
5. Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life 
insurance products. 
6. Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his 
firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life 
insurance products. 
7. Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a 
result of life insurance products was not disclosed during client meetings. 
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8. Mr. Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations. 
9. The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations are 
misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr. Bowen's 
firm. 
10. Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading 
because he does not have a law office in Idaho. 
11. Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with 
Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship. 
12. Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bowen's 
firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead. 
13. Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by 
the OPC in this disciplinary matter. 
14. Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Panel") 
discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the 
Crown Counsel Agreement, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements 
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice for furniture 
purchased by Mr. Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part. 
15. Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to 
disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance purchased by 
clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. Mr. Bowen did leave 
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with the Panel a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the 
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the 
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving. 
16. The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the 
failure to provide documents to OPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)) 
1. Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement 
for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, 
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the 
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie 
testified that Mr. Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for 
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By 
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time 
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a) 
(Fees). 
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule)) 
2. Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
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the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after 
consultation. 
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of 
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony 
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first 
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by 
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule). 
(Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services)) 
3. Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that 
"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1(a) 
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office 
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have 
offices in those locations. 
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
4. Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not 
use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. .." 
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
5 
Walnut Creek, California however his testimony was not clear nor specific about the 
alleged affiliations within those states. Mr. Bowen failed to produce any other evidence 
in the form of witnesses or documents to show that his use of these office locations on 
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firm's structure and services. The 
OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm 
locations were misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients 
of Mr. Bowen's firm. Additionally, Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho 
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho. The panel finds that 
considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr. 
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading the public, potential 
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of 
the firm's lawyers. By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek, 
California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those 
locations, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
5. Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "Lawyers may state 
or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the 
fact." Mr. Duke testified that he and Mr. Bowen had contemplated an "of counsel" 
relationship, drafted a proposed agreement concerning a potential affiliation and 
discussed the matter on and off, but nothing was concluded nor finalized between 
them. Mr. Bowen did not produce any evidence to the contrary, except to state that Mr. 
6 
Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support 
a violation by. Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his 
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr. 
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)) 
6. Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states t h a t " . . . a 
l awye r . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not. . . knowingly fail to respond 
to a lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule 
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." 
7. The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted 
mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Rule 1.6, confidentiality of client 
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel 
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation. However, with 
respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6), 
or the pending litigation (which the Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen 
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so. Some of the specific 
documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would 
have been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some, 
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations 
of failure to disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance 
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. 
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Although Mr, Bowen did leave with the Panel a stack of records that were represented 
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a 
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded 
and the complainants were leaving. 
8. The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client 
disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling" 
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the 
allegations against Mr. Bowen. However, the Panel recognized the arguments that 
appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some 
documents. The documents not related to client confidences should have been 
produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary process was substantially 
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide 
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated 
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters). 
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
9. Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the 
aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct). 
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RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen 
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be 
consolidated into one case only. The facts and circumstances arise out of common 
and connected events with the same complainants". Therefore, the Panel intends to 
find only one instance of a violation for each rule. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of / f e ^ / ^ 0 0 6 . 
Peg| jZ^^aeh, Chair 
Screening F * ih Panel "C-1" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this U>4-V\ day of •JMn , 2006, I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bowen 
c/o Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 




BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Bowen, Travis #00397 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 
05-0448 
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel 
"C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY 
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this the 3 ^ d a y of JyUi^ 2006. 
Lawrence E. Stevens, Chair 
Ethics and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (fl-Ht day of O a l ^ , 2006 I sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bowen 
do Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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ADDENDUM 3 
James E. Magleby (7247) 
Christopher M. Von Maack (10468) 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801.359.9000 
Facsimile: 801.359.9011 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant Branson G. Neff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual, TRAVIS 
L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual, TRAVIS 
L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah professional 
corporation, ABCO CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and WESTCo, an 
unregistered partnership between 




FILING RELATING TO BOWEN 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030100275 
Honorable Gordon J. Low 
Plaintiff Branson G. Neff ("Plaintiff or "Branson"), through counsel MAGLEBY & 
GREENWOOD, P.C, hereby submits this Plaintiffs Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since oral argument on the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants, Travis L. 
Bowen, P.C. and Travis L. Bowen (collectively, "Bowen"), Plaintiffs counsel realized that the 
"Public Reprimand" issued by the Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court against 
Bowen had not formally been made part of the record. Because Bowen's motion for partial 
summary judgment relies, in part, upon testimony from Plaintiffs expert John Morris, Esq. 
regarding Bowen's intent, and for other obvious reasons, this Public Reprimand is directly 
relevant to the motions. Accordingly, Plaintiff now respectfully supplements the record with this 
documentation. In addition, since Plaintiff is already supplementing the record, additional 
information and documents also relating to the pending motions are also submitted herewith. 
L PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
As noted, Plaintiff hereby supplements the record by submitting the Public Reprimand 
report against Bowen. [See Public Reprimand, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. In sum, Bowen was 
publicly reprimanded for charging "his client an excessive fee in trade for services," for 
instructing "his staff to increase his standard legal fee in order to pay for the furniture sold to his 
firm by the client/' for recommending "certain life insurance products without informing his 
clients of his or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchase 
those products," because his letterhead was misleading, and because Bowen "failed to provide 
certain documents requested by the Office of Professional Conduct." [Public Reprimand, Ex. A]. 
In addition to being directly relevant to credibility and intent, the transgressions by 
Bowen of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct reported in the Public Reprimand also bear 
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striking similarity to issues before the Court on Bowen's motions. In particular, with regard to 
the punitive damages issue, there is now additional evidence of Bowen's greed, including 
Bowen's dishonesty by instructing "his staff to increase his standard legal fee in order to pay for 
the furniture sold to his firm by the client," and Bowen's failure to disclose his conflicting 
financial interests in certain insurance products the was recommending. [Public Reprimand, Ex. A]. 
Similar issues, such as Bowen continuing to do work for Marvin, even while ignoring Branson's 
pleas for help, and the obvious financial incentives, are set forth in Branson's papers already on 
file with the Court. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 26(a) INITIAL 
DISCLOSURES 
After the completion of the briefing on Bowen's motions, Plaintiff completed certain 
damages expert reports. [See Expert Report of John Brough, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"]; [See Appraisal of 
Farr West, attached hereto as Exhibit "C"]. In addition, Plaintiff prepared and served upon counsel of 
record Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures ("Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Disclosures") . [See Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"]. 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures set forth in detail Plaintiffs primary damages 
theories against Marvin (and related entities) and Bowen. One theory relates to the argument 
that even if there was an agreement by the one-page "Property Settlement" document, it was an 
unenforceable "agreement to agree"; that any purported agreement is void for fraud; that any 
purported agreement is void for failure of a condition precedent; and that any purported 
agreement is void based upon Marvin's fundamental breaches of that agreement (among other 
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legal theories). Branson has detailed five areas of damages which he seeks against Bowen 
related to / arising from this theory. [See Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures at 4-5]. 
In the alternative, Branson seeks damages against Marvin and Bowen based upon the 
assumption that Marvin's legal theory is correct, that the one-page "Property Settlement" 
document is an enforceable agreement. In that event, Branson seeks at least nine areas of 
damages which he seeks against Bowen related to / arising from this theory. [See Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Disclosures at 9-10]. 
Accordingly, there is now additional evidence in the record regarding Plaintiffs specific 
damages claims against Bowen. 
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
As a threshold matter, for reasons already explained to the Court, expert testimony is not 
necessary in Utah to establish proximate cause in an attorney malpractice action. Indeed, even in 
very complicated cases (which this is not) and cases involving "somewhat strained" legal 
theories (which this is not), the Utah Supreme Court has held that proximate cause is an issue of 
fact for the jury. See, e.g., Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d. 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (quoting Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995)) 
(additional quotations and citation omitted) cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), appeal 
after remand, 2001 UT 107,37 P.3d 1130. 
Other courts, considering analogous facts, are in accord. For example, in First Union 
National Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 863-865 (8th Cir. 2005), the court determined that no 
expert testimony was required on proximate cause in a legal malpractice action asserting that 
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defendant caused injury by failing to file a lawsuit to determine the fair value of certain stock. 
Id. at 863-865. In fact, the jury was allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the 
hypothetical jury that would have decided the stock value lawsuit. Id. Here, of course, one issue 
is the value that Branson might have received had Bowen advised Branson not to sign any 
documents until a full, final, and fair deal was reached; and if one could not be reached, the value 
that a court would have found. As in First Union, a jury can decide these types of proximate 
cause issues. 
Similarly, the court in Morris v. Morris, 2003 WL 21509023 (Ohio App. 2003) held that 
"an expert is not required to prove the third prong of a legal malpractice claim, or proximate 
cause," and that the jury could infer proximate cause from the attorney's allowing a party to sign 
one-sided documents that benefited a seller (in this case it was the buyer), had not reviewed or 
discussed the agreements with the client before advising them to sign them, and had failed to 
properly fill out an application for a liquor license. Here, Bowen did more than allow Branson to 
sign one-sided documents, but he actually followed the instructions of Marvin to modify the 
documents to benefit Marvin *s interest, communicated on important issues directly with Marvin 
and not to Branson, chose to follow Marvin's instructions as to the division of real property even 
though he knew Branson disagreed with Marvin's position, allowed- in fact encouraged -
Branson to sign real property deeds even though he knew of the brother's disagreement over the 
property division, forged deeds, and the list goes on-and-on. 
Even though these cases indicate that Branson does not need expert testimony on 
proximate cause, as noted in the papers already on file with the Court, Mr. John Morris has given 
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and is prepared to testify about his opinions as to the "consequences" of Bowen's egregious 
breaches of his fiduciary duty. As set forth in Mr. Morris'report: 
Consequences of Breach 
The joint representation affected the advice that Bow en could give and the actions 
he could take on behalf of the Neffs. . . . [His attempted] neutrality prevented 
Bowen from adequately representing either of the Neffs. 
For example, Branson Neff needed independent and disinterested advice on 
whether to sign the Property Settlement, Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him 
from giving that advice. Branson Neff needed independent and disinterested 
advice on whether to require security to back Marvin *s obligations to Branson. 
Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him from giving that advice. Similarly, Branson 
Neff needed independent and disinterested advice on other issues such as the 
enforceability of the Property Settlement, Branson's rights to use equipment, the 
salary continuation agreement, water rights and all of the other issues that were 
disputed by the Neffs. Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him from giving that 
advice. Also, Bowen prepared incorrect deeds to the farm property. Bowen 
should not have given the signed erroneous deeds to Marvin Neff Bowen's dual 
loyalties prevented him from acting in Branson Neff's interests on this issue. 
More generally, many courses of action may be available to a client who is 
directly adverse to another party. An independent and disinterested lawyer may 
recommend any of these. A lawyer burdened with dual representation and dual 
loyalties is precluded from giving that advice. This limitation demonstrates why 
dual representation is prohibited in this situation. 
[Expert Report of John Morris at 6-7 (emphasis added), attached hereto as Exhibit "E"]. 
To the extent there is any question about these, and other issues, Plaintiff Branson G. 
Neff submits herewith a sworn statement, addressing some of the arguments made by Bowen's 
counsel at the hearing, and including the following: 
• As Branson indicated in his deposition when asked whether or not there 
was anything Bowen could do if he did not agree with Marvin: "I think at 
least [Bowen] could put the stuff in front of you and show you what was 
available and what could be done, the ramifications thereof." [Branson 
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Depo., Vol. 4, 876-877 (emphasis added), Ex. F to Branson's Statement of Additional 
Facts, Appendix 1 to Opposition to Bowen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any papers until a full, final, and 
complete agreement had been reached, Branson would have taken his 
advice. In fact, Branson raised exactly this issue with Bowen's office, and 
was told to sign certain deeds anyway, but that Bowen's office would 
make sure the documents didn't leave the office until there was a final 
agreement on the property descriptions. 
Although Branson testified that he generally did not like lawyers and 
would do whatever possible to avoid having to use lawyers, Branson 
obviously believed that a lawyer was necessary for purposes of dividing 
assets between Marvin and Branson. Otherwise, he would not have gone 
to the time and trouble of hiring Travis Bowen to represent him. 
It was at all times Branson's belief that Travis Bowen represented Branson 
(and Marvin) in the transaction. Bowen did not explain to Branson that 
there were conflict of interest problems, nor the ramifications of those 
problems. Certainly, Bowen did not explain to Branson the issues that 
were raised in the letters he sent 1998, when the brothers came to Bowen 
for asset protection work. Nor did Bowen have Branson sign or review 
any similar letter in 1999, when the brothers went to him for assistance in 
the buyout. 
Under the previous documents prepared by Bowen, because both Marvin 
and Branson were fifty percent (50%) owners in ABCO, no formal action 
could have been taken by the company to divest Branson of any particular 
rights, ownership, or benefits. In other words, if Marvin and Branson did 
not reach an agreement, then there would have been a "stalemate." 
If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any documents relating to a 
potential agreement with Marvin, until such time as a full, final, and 
complete agreement had been reached, Branson would have followed his 
advice and not signed the one-page "Property Settlement" document, nor 
the three additional documents prepared by Bowen, nor any of the real 
property deeds relating to the farm house and other properties. In fact, 
Branson did not want to sign some of these documents, but did so after he 
was told to sign by his lawyer. 
If Branson had been unable to reach an agreement with his brother, at least 
he would have remained on paper as a fifty percent (50%) owner in 
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ABCO, and would have been in a better position to demand fifty percent 
(50%) of all the benefits from the company, including salary, health 
insurance, auto benefits, and other benefits provided by the company to 
Marvin and Branson. 
• In addition, if Bowen had explained to Branson that in the event of a 
stalemate, he could ultimately force Marvin to buy his interest in the 
company pursuant to the Share Redemption Agreement, and that the only 
other alternative available to Marvin would have been that we continue to 
operate the company as fifty-fifty (50/50) owners, Branson would have 
been in a much better bargaining position than after Bowen let him sign 
the one-page Property Settlement document. 
• In addition, because Bowen prepared the additional documents which 
Branson signed, including the real property deeds which Branson did not 
want to sign, but which Bowen's office told him would be kept safe, 
Branson would not have had to spend the last four (4) years litigating the 
issues in this case as to whether or not the Property Settlement was a 
"final" document. 
• Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Branson lost record-
title to the 5 Acres, and Marvin has now sold that property. If Branson 
had never signed the deeds prepared by Bowen's office, Marvin would not 
have been able to sell the 5 Acres. 
• Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Branson lost the ability 
to file suit against Marvin for the unequal payments he made to his 
children, totaling $63,000. 
• Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Marvin is asserting in 
this case that Branson lost all rights to payments under the Salary 
Continuation Agreement. If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any 
documents until it was clear that Branson was going to continue to work 
for ABCO and be qualified to the benefits of the Salary Continuation 
Agreement, Branson would have followed that advice. Certainly, Bowen 
did not tell Branson that he risked losing the benefits of the Salary 
Continuation Agreement by signing documents before a final and 
complete agreement was reached. 
[Affidavit of Branson G. Neff, attached as Exhibit "F"]. 
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In short, had Bowen complied with his fiduciary duties, Branson would have obviously 
followed his advice and not found himself in the unenviable position of trying to resist an 
unenforceable "agreement to agree" which was put together by his adversary and brother Marvin 
G. Neff, and the attorney Branson believed was representing him and defending his interests, 
Travis L. Bowen. At the least, the jury gets to decide this issue. 
Accordingly, to the extent there was any doubt that there are questions of fact on the 
issue of proximate cause, that question has (again) been unequivocally answered in the negative. 
The Court must deny Bowen's motion for summary judgment "if there is any evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could infer causation." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293 (emphases in 
original). And, "'it only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1292 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the additional reasons noted, the Court should deny Bowen's motions for summary 
judgment. 
DATED this 4th day of October 2006. 
MAGLEBY 4fGkEH>IWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Christopher M. Von Maack 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant Branson G. Neff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C., 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL FILING RELATING TO BOWEN DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to the following this 4th day of October 2006 by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Electronic Mail 
Marlin J. Grant 
James C. Jenkins 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim 
Plaintiff and Cross Claim Plaintiff 
Marvin G. Neff 
Michael F. Skolnick 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Gary T. Wight 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross Claim 
Defendants Travis L. Bowen, Esq. and 
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ADDENDUM 5 
GREGORY G. SKORDAS (#3865) 
REBECCA C. HYDE (#6409) 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE 
Suite 1104 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531^7444 
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, : 




UTAH STATE BAR, : 
: OPC No. 05-0391,05-0433,05-0628,05-
Respondent. : 0448 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, Travis L. Bowen, being first duly sworn, deposes and states the following: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, am competent in all respects to testify 
and have personal knowledge of the matters asserted herein. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. 
3. On January 19,20061 attended a hearing before a screening panel of the Utah 
Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee involving several informal complaints against 
me. 
4. The screening panel that heard my disciplinary matters had four members. 
I do not recall whether the members of the panel were introduced prior to or during the hearing. 
5. I do not recall Christine Greenwood's firm affiliation with attorney James 
Magleby being disclosed prior to or during the hearing. 
6. Christine Greenwood did not disclose during the hearing that she was the law 
partner of an attorney, James Magleby, who was prosecuting a civil lawsuit in First District Court 
("the First District Suit") against me. 
7. I am aware that James Magleby was employed by the firm, Ballard, Spahr 
Andrews & Ingersoll at the outset of the First District Suit. 
8. I am aware that Mr. Magleby moved to a different firm at some point in time 
while the First District Suit was pending. 
9. I did not pay any attention to the name of the firm or firms which employed 
Mr. Magleby after he left the Ballard, Spahr firm. 
10. I was not aware at the time of the January 19,2006 screening panel hearing 
that Christine Greenwood was Mr. Magleby9 s law partner. 
Page -2-
11. Had I been aware or been made aware I would have objected or asked my 
counsel to object based on the obvious conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety. 
DATED this Z]_ day of November/lOT^T 
TRAVIS L. BOWEN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £ j ! day of November, 2006 
My Commission Expires: 
_ _ CONOR P. BU E 
NOTARY PUBUC-STATEOFUTAH 
. 316111HAVS. 
wjtArecir* w 84ios 
MyComm. Exp. 05/16/2009 
C:\Documents and Settings\TBowen\Local SettingsYTemporary Internet Files\OLK3D0\Affidavit of Travis Bowen.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 6 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 8, § 4 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
-•Sec. 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court—Judges pro tempore— 
Regulation of practice of law] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore 
to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residentsf and admitted to practice law in Utah. The 
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of lawf including admission to 
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?prft^ Page 1 of 1 
UT ST § 78-7-1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-7-1 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. COURTS 
CHAPTER 7. GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 
•*§ 78-7-1. Disqualification for interest or relation to parties 
(1) Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge, or justice court judge 
may sit or act in any action or proceeding: 
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; 
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within 
the third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or 
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or 
proceeding. 
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the 
calendar or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of 
transferring the action or proceeding to some other court. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?prft= Page 1 of 1 
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Standing Committee on Professional Discipline 
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
I. Structure And Scope 
Rule 2. The Disciplinary Board Of The Supreme Court Of [This State] 
A. Agency. There is hereby established one permanent statewide agency to administer the 
lawyer discipline and disability system. The agency consists of a statewide board as 
provided in this Rule 2, hearing committees as provided for in Rule 3, disciplinary counsel as 
provided for in Rule 4, and staff appointed by the board and counsel. The agency is a unitary 
entity. While it performs both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, these functions shall 
be separated within the agency insofar as practicable in order to avoid unfairness. The 
prosecutorial functions shall be directed by a lawyer employed full-time by the agency and 
performed, insofar as practicable, by employees of the agency. The adjudicative functions 
shall be performed by practicing lawyers and public members. No official of the [state bar] 
shall have the right to appoint any members or serve in an ex officio capacity. 
P> A. Appointment. A board shall be appointed by the court with the requisite authority and 
responsibility to administer the lawyer discipline and disability system. The board shall 
consist of [nine] members to serve for fixed, staggered terms, and to be referred to as the 
"board," which shall consist of: 
(1) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for 
an initial term of three years; 
(2) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for 
an initial term of two years; and 
(3) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for 
an initial term of one year. 
Subsequent terms of all members shall be for three years. No member shall serve more than 
two consecutive three-year terms. The members of the board shall not be subject to removal 
by the court during their terms of office except for cause. 
C* A. Election of Officers. The members of the board shall annually elect [the Court shall annually 
appoint] lawyer members as chair and vice-chair. The chair, and in the chair's absence the 
vice-chair, shall perform the duties normally associated with that office and shall preside 
over all meetings of the full board, ruling on all motions, objections, and evidence. 
I?* A. Quorum. [Five] members shall constitute a quorum. The board shall act only with the 
concurrence of a majority of the whole board except as to administrative matters, which 
shall only require a majority of those present and voting. 
£r , A. Compensation and Expenses. Members shall receive no compensation for their services, but 
may be reimbursed for travel and other expenses incidental to the performance of their 
duties. 
f~* A. Abstention and Disqualification of Board Members; [Alternate Members]. 
(1) Board members shall refrain from taking part in any proceeding in which a 
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judge, similarly situated, would be required to abstain. 
(2) In addition to complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding a 
former judge or arbitrator (Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12), a former 
member of the board shall not personally represent a lawyer in any proceeding 
as provided in these Rules for a period of one year following completion of the 
member's service. 
[(3) The court shall maintain current rosters of lawyer and nonlawyer alternates. 
If a board member becomes incapacitated or disqualified, the next alternate on 
the appropriate roster shall take the place of the board member in the matter.] 
A. Powers and Duties. The board shall have the following powers and duties: 
(1) To propose rules of procedure for lawyer discipline and disability 
proceedings for promulgation by the court, and to comment on the enforceability 
of existing and proposed [Rules of Professional Conduct]; 
(2) To review periodically the operation of the system with the court; 
(3) To appoint three or more hearing committees [within each disciplinary 
district] and 
(i) establish the rotation by which they will be assigned formal 
hearings, 
(ii) designate the chair for each, and 
(Hi) assign the chair to review in rotation dispositions by the central 
intake office, recommendations of counsel for disposition of 
disciplinary matters and petitions for transfer to and from disability 
inactive status pursuant to Rule 3(E)(1); 
(4) To perform appellate review functions, consisting of review of the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations of adjudicators in hearings on 
lesser misconduct pursuant to Rule 18(H) and of hearing committees with 
respect to formal charges, petitions for transfer to and from disability inactive 
status, and petitions for reinstatement, and prepare and forward to the court its 
own findings, if any, and recommendations, together with the record of the 
proceedings before the hearing committee; 
(5) To administer reprimands; 
(6) To impose probation for a specified period with the consent of the 
respondent; 
(7) To appoint and supervise its staff [including counsel], separate from the 
prosecutorial staff, to assist the board in its functions; 
(8) To inform the public about the existence and operation of the system and the 
disposition of each matter in which public discipline has been imposed, a lawyer 
has been transferred to or from disability inactive status, or a lawyer has been 
reinstated or readmitted; and 
(9) To delegate, in its discretion, to the chair or vice chair the power to act for the 
board on administrative and procedural matters. 
Commentary 
With more than 750,000 lawyers licensed to practice in the United States, the highest courts of 
the states cannot handle discipline and disability matters directly by themselves. The agency 
assists the court in the exercise of its inherent power to supervise the bar, inquiring into all 
matters assigned to its jurisdiction by the court's rules of disciplinary enforcement. The agency 
performs prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and reports its findings and 
recommendations to the court. 
A statewide system provides the greatest degree of structural impartiality since it minimizes the 
adverse effects of local bias. Moreover, a statewide structure provides uniformity, since only a 
single statewide court and a single statewide agency are involved in the process. In a 
decentralized structure, complaints in one community may be governed by one set of standards 
and those in a different community by another. Consequently, lawyers admitted to practice in the 
same state may receive radically different discipline for the same misconduct 
A single statewide agency avoids these problems by imposing a single standard of conduct 
throughout the state. 
In a unitary system, both prosecution and adjudication are the responsibility of a single agency. 
Nevertheless, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions should be separated as much as possible 
within the unitary system to avoid unfairness and any appearance of unfairness. Persons who 
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perform prosecutorial functions should neither perform nor supervise persons who perform 
adjudicative functions, and vice versa. In addition, persons who perform adjudicative functions in 
a particular matter at a preliminary stage should not thereafter perform nor have control over 
persons who must later perform ultimate adjudicative functions in the same matter. 
The disciplinary system should be controlled and managed exclusively by the state's highest 
court and not by state or local bar associations for these compelling reasons. First, the 
disciplinary process should be directed solely by the disciplinary policy of the court and its 
appointees and not influenced by the internal politics of bar associations. Second, the 
disciplinary system should be free from even the appearance of conflicts of interest or 
impropriety. When elected bar officials control all or parts of the disciplinary process, these 
appearances are created, regardless of the actual fairness and impartiality of the system. This is 
true whether the bar is unified or not. 
Bar associations can properly manage such programs as mandatory fee arbitration, lawyer 
practice assistance, continuing legal education, voluntary arbitration and mediation. Bar 
operation of these programs does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of 
impropriety. Although some of these programs may interact with the disciplinary process, it is 
entirely appropriate for the organized bar to cooperate with the court in the administration of such 
programs. Nothing in these rules should be construed as prohibiting bars from continuing to 
manage non-disciplinary matters nor should these rules be interpreted to support the elimination 
of unified state bars. Indeed, given the funding requirements of many of these programs, bars 
will be performing a vital public service in fulfilling these functions. 
It is of course desirable, and in the larger states essential, for the board to have available the 
assistance of staff to carry out its functions. Staff responsible directly to the board, totally 
separate from counsel, should be hired for that purpose to further the separation of the 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions within the unitary agency. 
In the appointment process, there should be appropriate representation of all segments of the 
public and the profession, including minority members, women, and solo or small firm 
practitioners. A combination of lawyers and nonlawyers on the board results in a more balanced 
evaluation of complaints. Currently more than two-thirds of all jurisdictions involve public 
members in their disciplinary structure. Participation by nonlawyers increases the credibility of 
the discipline and disability process in the eyes of the public. There is a human tendency to 
suspect the objectivity of a discipline body composed solely of members of the respondent's 
professional colleagues. Involving public members helps allay that suspicion. 
It is recommended that the board have at least nine members. A multiple of three is necessary to 
preserve a ratio of two-thirds lawyers and one-third public members. A three-member board may 
be simply too small to enable volunteers to cope with the workload. A six-member board is not 
recommended because an even-numbered membership makes possible a tie vote. At least one-
third [or a higher proportion] of all adjudicators should be nonlawyers. 
The members of the board should be appointed by the court since the agency is created to assist 
the court in carrying out its discipline and disability functions. The court may appoint a roster of 
alternates to be available if a board member becomes incapacitated or disqualified. A roster of 
alternates avoids the necessity of selecting a particular individual to sit for a particular case, 
which may raise claims of unfairness. 
Board members should not be appointed for more than two consecutive terms. Absence of 
periodic rotation restricts the number of individuals who can participate and may perpetuate 
outmoded practice and procedures. The terms of the members should not be so long that the 
disciplinary function is inaccessible and unresponsive to changes in the lawyer community. 
Terms should not be longer than three years. Periodic rotation of the members requires that 
terms be set in multiples of three. A six-year term would allow a member to serve for twelve 
consecutive years, which may inhibit responsiveness to the changes in legal practice in the 
community. 
The board members should elect their own chair and vice-chair, both of whom should be lawyers 
since they will preside over appeals and rule on motions and evidence. 
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If Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(c)(1) and (2) are complied with, a lawyer in the firm of 
a former board member is not imputedly disqualified. 
The court and the board should cooperate in the administration of the system. In performing the 
duties imposed by the system, the board's staff should perform record keeping functions, docket 
matters to be heard by the board, prepare reports and financial documents, and perform similar 
administrative tasks. Although it is the court's responsibility to promulgate the rules governing 
the structure, the court should give great weight to the board's recommendations. 
Recommendations to the court pertaining to the operation of the system generally should be 
distinguished from ex parte communications about individual cases. 
To ensure there is adequate oversight, the court may wish to have the administrative arm of the 
court review the budget and provide comments to the court and disciplinary counsel. The board 
and disciplinary counsel should periodically file reports concerning their operations with the 
court. 
Hearing committees are appointed by the board but function independently. The board should 
appoint at least three hearing committees, since two hearing committees may be disqualified 
because of the participation by their chairs in the review of recommendations of counsel for 
disposition of a matter after investigation. 
Lawyer population and the size of the state may require the state to be divided into disciplinary 
districts. If that becomes necessary, at least three hearing committees should be appointed per 
district. 
The presiding officer of the hearing committee should be a lawyer since the presiding officer 
rules on motions and objections. The composition of the hearing committee, membership 
rotation, and the length of terms of the members should be determined by weighing the same 
factors applied to board members. Hearing committee members should be assigned to each 
committee permanently, not ad hoc. Hearing committees should be scheduled in advance to 
meet at fixed intervals and in rotation, not ad hoc. This greatly reduces the administrative burden 
of scheduling meetings and systematizes the work flow for both the board and counsel. 
The board may prepare and forward its own findings and recommendations and administer 
reprimands. The report and recommendation of the board is advisory only. The court may modify 
the findings and may increase or decrease the discipline recommended. 
The public interest is served by wide publication of the availability of a process for investigating 
and disposing of substantial allegations of misconduct. Care should be taken in doing so, to 
avoid encouraging frivolous or unfounded complaints. 
Increasing the public's awareness of the discipline and disability process can be accomplished 
in many ways. The agency can prepare a short fact sheet or pamphlet, describing what it does 
and how it does it, explaining where and how to get information. The rules governing the 
agency's operations should be readily available. Public information about the system and cases 
within it should be easily accessible on request 
Public confidence in the discipline and disability process will be increased as the profession 
acknowledges the existence of lawyer misconduct, and shows the public what the agency is 
doing about it. 
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UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER 12. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
-4CANON 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially 
and diligently 
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judge take 
precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties 
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the 
performance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in 
which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another 
court occurs. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge 
shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official 
capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court 
officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge 
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest 
bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon 
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all reasonable 
efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial 
direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to avoid behavior 
that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain 
from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Canon does not 
preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar 
factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. 
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and 
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or 
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impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court personnel whose 
function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative 
responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge does not abrogate 
the responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. No 
communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall occur between 
the trial judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written 
communication or the substance of any oral communication is provided to all 
parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law 
applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the 
parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords 
the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent 
of the parties either in writing or on the record, confer separately with the 
parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending 
before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and 
fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, 
make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome 
or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially 
interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A judge should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction and 
control. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in 
the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the 
procedures of the court. This Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a 
judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than 
in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express appreciation to 
jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community. 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial 
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to 
the public. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative 
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence in 
judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court officials in 
the administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and 
diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or 
prejudice in the performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other 
judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of 
matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial 
responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power 
of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism 
and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond 
web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft^ Page 2 of 4 
the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate 
disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of 
which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to information 
generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial Performance 
Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had 
practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the time of their 
association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 
concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the 
judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the 
judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in 
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has any 
other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by 
the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a 
party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that 
could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 
proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about 
the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor children 
residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E 
may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and 
their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive 
disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification 
other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and 
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not 
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may 
^veb2.westlawxom/print/printstream.as^ Page 3 of 4 
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record, 
or if written, filed in the case file. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP 
-+RULE 1.7. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b)f a lawyer shall not represent a client 
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or 
(a)(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a)f a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
2006 
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UT Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-503 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER 14. RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR 
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
-*RULE 14-503. ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The 
Committee shall consist of eight public members and 26 members of the Bar who 
have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct. All appointments 
shall be for a term of three years. The Supreme Court shall designate one 
lawyer member as Committee chair and one lawyer member as Committee vice 
chair. Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms. 
(b) Committee chair. The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee and 
screening panels. The chair is responsible to maintain an adequate check on 
the work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move forward 
expeditiously, to determine that screening panels have a uniform basis for the 
judgments renderedf and to provide the screening panels with information 
concerning ethics and judicial decisions necessary to their activities. The 
chair shall make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning appointments 
to the screening panels and reports concerning the activities of the screening 
panels and the overall work of the Committee. 
(c) Vice chair. The Committee vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's 
absence or resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in 
any of the Committee chair's duties. 
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee membersf except for the Committee 
chair and Committee vice chair, shall be divided into four screening panel 
sections of six members of the Bar and two public members. The Supreme Court 
shall name a screening panel chair from each screening panel, who shall preside 
over the screening panel. In the absence of the screening panel chair, a 
screening panel vice chair designated by the screening panel shall preside. Two 
members of the Bar plus one public member shall constitute a quorum of a 
screening panel. The concurrence of a majority of those members present and 
voting at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination. 
If an even number of screening panel members participate in a proceeding, the 
chair or vice chair shall not vote unless necessary to break a tie. The chair 
or vice chair shall, however, fully participate in the proceeding. Each 
screening panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry 
out its duties. The entire Committee may be convened at such other times by 
the chair as necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties. 
(e) Resignations, alternates. If a Committee member does not attend three 
consecutive scheduled screening panel hearings, that Committee member shall 
automatically be deemed to have resigned his or her Committee appointment. 
Members of any screening panel may serve as alternate members on different 
screening panels. The Committee chair and the Committee vice chair may serve 
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as alternate members on all screening panels. 
(f) Responsibilities. Informal complaints shall be randomly assigned to 
screening panels. The screening panels shall review, investigate, and hear all 
informal complaints charging unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against 
members of the Bar. After such review, investigation, hearing and analysis, 
the screening panels shall determine the action to be taken on any informal 
complaint which, based upon the facts of the particular case, is most 
consistent with the public interest and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(g) Subpoena. Any party or a screening panel, for good cause shown, may 
petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena 
duces tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal 
complaint. Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this rule shall 
require a five-day written notice to the opposing party prior to the issuance 
of an appropriate order of subpoena. 
(g)(1) Enforcement of subpoena. A district court in the district in which the 
attendance or production is required may, upon proper application, enforce the 
attendance and testimony of any witnesses and the production of any documents 
subpoenaed. 
(g)(2) Quashing subpoena. Any attack on the validity of a subpoena so issued 
shall be heard and determined by the Committee chair or by the court wherein 
enforcement of the subpoena is being sought. Any resulting order is not 
appealable prior to the entry of a final order in the proceeding. 
(g)(3) Witnesses and fees. Subpoena fees, witness fees, and mileage shall be 
reimbursed in the amounts provided under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(h)(1) Committee and OPC as screening panel secretary. OPC counsel shall be 
the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility of the 
administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening panel 
calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of the Bar 
whose attendance is requested, notifying those who have filed informal 
complaints of the times and dates their matters will be heard, and otherwise 
performing or providing the secretarial and administrative functions of the 
Committee and screening panels. Except as otherwise provided in this article, 
whenever OPC counsel may be present before a screening panel during a hearing, 
the respondent may also be present. 
(h)(2) OPC counsel shall within three months after the filing of an informal 
complaint of unprofessional or unethical conduct of a respondent, advise the 
party making the informal complaint concerning the initial consideration of the 
informal complaint, and shall promptly advise such party in writing of the 
subsequent disposition of the informal complaint and the reasons therefor. 
(i) Annual report. Senior counsel shall prepare and submit an annual report to 
the Supreme Court and the Board encompassing the scope and nature of the 
Committee work. The report shall be submitted on or about August 1 of each 
year for the preceding fiscal year and shall set forth the number of 
disciplinary cases investigated, the number brought before the Committee, 
formal complaints filed, dispositions, cases dismissed, informal ethics 
opinions issued, diversionary dispositions and such other information as may be 
helpful to the Supreme Court in comprehending the operations of the OPC as well 
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as the efficiency and effectiveness of the disciplinary system. Such report 
may contain Committee recommendations for rule amendments or changes in 
Committee procedure. The chair and senior counsel shall annually consult with 
the Board and the Supreme Court regarding the level of activity and general 
standing of disciplinary matters and procedures. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
2006 
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PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER 14, RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR 
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
-»RULE 14-510. PROSECUTION AND APPEALS 
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct. 
(a)(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member 
of the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Barr 
in writing, an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language 
setting forth the acts or omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional 
conduct. Upon filing, an informal complaint shall be processed in accordance 
with this article. 
(a)(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be in any 
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing, 
although a form may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal 
complaint format. It is unnecessary that the informal complaint recite 
disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a prayer requesting specific disciplinary 
action. The informal complaint shall be signed by the complainant and shall 
set forth the complainant's address, and may list the names and addresses of 
other witnesses. The informal complaint shall be notarized and contain a 
verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the 
complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b), complaints filed by OPC are not 
required to contain a verification. The substance of the informal complaint 
shall prevail over the form. 
(a)(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC 
counsel shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the 
informal complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, 
OPC counsel shall seek additional facts from the complainant; additional facts 
shall also be submitted in writing and signed by the complainant. 
(a)(4) Notice of informal complaint. Upon completion of the preliminary 
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can 
be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the 
complainant's interest. OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their 
efforts to resolve the informal complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be 
so resolved or if it sets forth facts which, by their very nature, should be 
brought before the screening panel, or if good cause otherwise exists to bring 
the matter before the screening panel, OPC counsel shall cause to be served a 
NOIC by regular mail upon the respondent at the address reflected in the 
records of the Bar. The NOIC shall have attached a true copy of the signed 
informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with particularity 
the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the 
informal complaint as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel. 
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(a)(5) Answer to informal complaint. Within 2 0 days after service of the NOIC 
on the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and 
signed answer setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the 
informal complaint, together with all defenses and responses to the claims of 
possible misconduct. For good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for 
the filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days. 
Upon the answer having been filed or if the respondent fails to respond, OPC 
counsel shall refer the case to a screening panel for investigation, 
consideration and determination. OPC counsel shall forward a copy of the 
answer to the complainant. 
(a)(6) Dismissal of informal complaint. An informal complaint which, upon 
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous, 
unintelligible, barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed 
in another forum, unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of 
any unprofessional conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be dismissed 
by OPC counsel without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel shall notify 
the complainant of such dismissal stating the reasons therefor. The 
complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC counsel to the Committee chair within 
15 days after notification of the dismissal is mailed. Upon appeal, the 
Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file, either affirm the 
dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the matter for 
hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair 
shall appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and 
determine the appeal. 
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels. 
(b)(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal 
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by 
the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, and the 
recommendations of OPC counsel. 
(b)(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may result in 
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the 
screening panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an 
opportunity to appear before the screening panel and testify under oath, 
together with any witnesses called by the respondent, and to present an oral 
argument with respect to the informal complaint. All testimony shall be 
recorded and preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event, 
not less than six months following the hearing. A written brief may also be 
submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed 
five pages in length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair 
or the chair's delegate for good cause shown. A copy of the brief shall be 
forwarded by OPC counsel to the complainant. 
(b)(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to appear 
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any 
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or 
in opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may 
be represented by counsel or some other representative. 
(b)(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall each 
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless 
excluded by the screening panel chair for good cause shown. 
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(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts developed 
by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening 
panel, in behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the following 
determinations: 
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is 
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel 
shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant 
and the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed 
by OPC counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the 
future conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be 
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the 
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the 
caution; or 
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the 
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be warranted 
by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or 
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with 
an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be 
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall 
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the 
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such screening 
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of 
the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an 
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days 
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with 
an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a 
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and 
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and 
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public reprimand. A copy of 
such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior 
to the delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee 
chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding the respondent if no exception 
has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation being provided 
to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent. 
(b)(6) Determination of appropriate sanction. In determining an appropriate 
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may 
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent 
within the five years immediately preceding the alleged offense. 
(b)(7) Continuance of disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary proceeding may 
be held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint 
when the allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial 
similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation 
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in which the respondent is involved. 
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten days after 
notice of the recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the 
Committee chair, the respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception 
to the recommendation and may also, if desired, request a hearing. If a 
request for a hearing is made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair 
designated by the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an 
expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the respondent having the opportunity 
to be present. The complainant's testimony may be read into the record. The 
complainant need not appear personally unless called by the respondent as an 
adverse witness for purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have 
the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is unreasonable, 
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise 
clearly erroneous. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
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ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
-•RULE 14-511. PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
(a) Commencement of action. If the screening panel finds probable cause to 
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a formal 
complaint is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district 
court a formal complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts 
upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable 
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The formal complaint shall be 
signed by the Committee chair or, in the chair's absence, by the Committee vice 
chair or a screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair. 
(b) Venue. The action shall be brought and the trial shall be held in the 
county in which an alleged offense occurred or in the county where the 
respondent resides or practices law or last practiced law in Utah; provided, 
however, that if the respondent is not a resident of Utah and the alleged 
offense is not committed in Utah, the trial shall be held in a county 
designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The parties may 
stipulate to a change of venue in accordance with applicable law (currently 
Utah Code section 78-13-9). 
(c) Style of proceedings. All proceedings instituted by the OPC shall be 
styled "In the Matter of the Discipline of (name of respondent and respondent's 
Bar number), Respondent." 
(d) Change of judge as a matter of right. 
(d)(1) Notice of change. The respondent or OPC counsel may, by filing a notice 
indicating the name of the assigned judge, the date on which the formal 
complaint was filed, and that a good faith effort has been made to serve all 
parties, change the judge assigned to the case. The notice shall not specify 
any reason for the change of judge. The party filing the notice shall send a 
copy of the notice to the assigned judge and to the presiding judge. The party 
filing the notice may request reassignment to another district court judge from 
the same district, which request shall be granted. Under no circumstances 
shall more than one change of judge be allowed to each party under this rule. 
(d)(2) Time. Unless extended by the court upon a showing of good cause, the 
notice must be filed within 30 days after commencement of the action or prior 
to the notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first. Failure to file a 
timely notice precludes any change of judge under this rule. 
(d)(3) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the 
assigned judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge 
shall promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall 
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reassign the action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the 
clerk shall promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
who shall determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the 
action. 
(d)(4) .Rule 63 and Rule 63A unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights a 
party may have pursuant to Rule 63 or Rule 63A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(e) Actions tried to the bench; findings and conclusions. All actions tried 
according to this article shall be tried to the bench, and the district court 
shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither masters nor 
commissioners shall be utilized. 
(f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as reasonably 
practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days after the district 
court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it shall hold a 
hearing to receive relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and shall 
within five days thereafter, enter an order sanctioning the respondent. Upon 
reasonable notice to the parties, the court, at its discretion, may hold the 
sanctions hearing immediately after the misconduct proceeding. 
(g) Review. Any discipline order by the district court may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court through a petition for review pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
2006 
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-+RULE 14-513. IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL SUITS 
Participants in proceedings conducted under this article shall be entitled to 
the same protections for statements made in the course of the proceedings as 
participants in judicial proceedings. The district courts, Committee members, 
special counsel appointed pursuant to Rule 14-517(f), supervising attorneys 
engaged in pro bono assistance, trustees appointed pursuant to Rule 14-52 7, and 
OPC counsel and staff shall be immune from suit, except as provided in Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 65A and 65B, for any conduct committed in the course 
of their official duties, including the investigatory stage. There is no 
immunity from civil suit for intentional misconduct. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
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